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Negligence-based liability has been justified on the grounds of its 
efficiency properties. However, this approach towards liability assignment has 
been criticized in several recent writings.  In a series of articles, causation-based 
apportionment of liability has been recommended, as an alternative basis for 
liability assignment.  In an interesting paper, Parisi and Fon (2004) have studied 
various properties of the causation-based liability. In this paper, I review some of 
their propositions. The main aim of the paper, however, is to investigate the 
implications of the ‘alternative’ specification of liability. The paper shows that a 
combination of negligence-based and causation-based liability makes the 
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The literature on liability rules is replete with economic analyses of fault or negligence-
based regimes.1 Negligence-based liability has been rationalized and justiﬁed on the
grounds of its eﬃciency properties. However, in a series of articles, this approach towards
liability has been severely criticized. Several noted scholars have recommended causation-
based apportionment of liability, as an alternative basis for liability assignment.2 In an
interesting contribution, Parisi and Fon (2004) have studied various properties of the
causation-based liability assignment. In this paper, I review some of their propositions.
The main aim of the paper, however, is to investigate the implications of causation based
apportionment of liability.
Under liability rules that use negligence-based approach towards liability assignment,
a party usually faces either full liability or no liability at all. For example, under the rule
of negligence, an injurer has no liability if he is not negligent. But, his liability jumps
from none to full, the moment his care level falls just below the due level of care, even
when the victim takes no care at all. Similarly, under the rule of strict liability with the
defense of contributory negligence, the victim’s liability jumps from none to full, depend-
ing on whether his care level is just above the due level or falls just short of that level,
irrespective of the care level of the injurer.
While criticizing negligence-based liability, it has been argued that this approach to-
wards liability assignment neglects the causal contributions of the parties involved. There-
fore, it does not form a convincing basis for liability assignment, particularly between a
non-negligent injurer and a vigilant victim. In addition, the argument goes, it is either
inapplicable or unsatisfactory in the cases where multiple causation is involved or where
fault is not easy to establish (Strassfeld, 1992; Calabresi and Cooper, 1996; Parisi and
1For example, see Polinsky (1989), Landes and Posner (1987), Shavell (1987), Arlen, J (1990), Miceli
(1997), Cooter and Ulen (1998), Jain and Singh (2002), etc. For a comprehensive account of the positive
theory of torts doctrines see Hylton (2000), and Geistfeld (2001).
2See, Calabresi and Cooper (1996).
1Fon, 2004).3 In contrast, under causal apportionment of liability, parties bear accident
loss in shares that are proportional to their contribution to the loss. Therefore, causal
apportionment of liability is said to be consistent with the principle of equity, which re-
quires loss spreading between parties (Honor´ e, 1997).4 Moreover, as various studies have
revealed, this approach is being used by some courts in many countries, including France,
Germany, Japan and the United States (see, e.g., Yoshihsa (1999), Grimley (2000), Yu
(2000), and Parisi and Fon (2004)).
It is in the context of the above-mentioned debates that Parisi and Fon (2004) have
studied the desirability or otherwise of the causation-based liability. For several reasons,
the paper by Parisi and Fon is an important contribution in tort literature. First, it sys-
tematically investigates the eﬀects of causation-based apportionment of liability on care as
well as activity levels of the parties involved. Second, it highlights the inappropriateness
of negligence-based regimes. Fault-based or negligence-based legal systems do not provide
a reasonable criterion for loss sharing, particularly when neither the injurer nor the victim
was negligent at the time of accident. Finally, in the context of a formal analysis, it seeks
to provide an explanation for the scope of causation-based division of liability. The last
exercise is undertaken both for historical as well as contemporary legal regimes.
In order to investigate the eﬃciency implications of the causation-based liability, Parisi
and Fon have introduced and analysed two liability rules. The ﬁrst liability rule has been
deﬁned as the rule of Pure Comparative Causation. Under this rule, parties bear accident
loss in shares that are proportional to their causal contribution to the loss, regardless of
whether at the time accident parties were at fault or not. In their analysis, the authors
have shown that since each party bears only a fraction of the loss, there is an incentive to
choose less than socially optimal care and more than socially optimal activity levels. That
3For criticisms of economic modelling of liability rules on various grounds see Grady (1989), Kahan
(1989), Mark (1994), Burrow (1999), and Wright (2002)
4Honor´ e, Tony (1997) has argued that the morality of tort law requires that liability of a party should
be proportional to the parties causal contribution. Also see, Calabresi (1965, and 1970).
2is, the rule of Pure Comparative Causation induces neither eﬃcient care levels nor eﬃcient
activity levels. Next, they discuss the eﬃciency of what they call the rule of Comparative
Causation Under Negligence. This rule mixes essential features of traditional negligence-
criterion based rules, and of the rule of Pure Comparative Causation. Under this rule,
when a party is found solely negligent, the entire loss is borne by that party. Accident
loss is shared between the parties in cases wherein both the parties are found negligent, or
where both are found non-negligent. In such cases, the loss-sharing takes place as under
the rule of Pure Comparative Causation.5
Motivation behind introducing the essential feature of negligence-based liability under
the rule of comparative causation comes from the mainstream understanding of the need
for fault-based liability. Dominant understanding is that “a point of discontinuity in the
liability curves faced by the parties must be created to entice both parties to choose op-
timal care and activity levels.”6 Assuming that the due care levels for the parties are set
at the levels that are socially optimal, if this rule could induce both the parties to take
the due care and eﬃcient activity levels, it will have the unique virtue of being eﬃcient
as well as equitable.
However, Parisi and Fon (2004) have stated the following propositions about incentive
eﬀects under the rule of Comparative Causation Under Negligence: (i) In equilibrium,
parties are never induced to take more than the due care. (ii) Multiple equilibria in which
one or both the parties take less than the due care are possible, i.e., in equilibrium, one or
both the parties can be negligent. (iii) In some contexts, choice of due care by both the
parties is also a possibility. (iv) Though there is an incentive to mitigate activity levels,
each party’s activity level will be greater than the corresponding socially optimal level.
5Proportional loss sharing also takes place under the rule of comparative negligence, but only when
both parties are negligent. For an analysis of this rule see Schwartz, G. (1978), Landes and Posner (1980),
Cooter and Ulen (1986), Haddock and Curran (1985), Rubinfeld (1987), Rea (1987), Chung (1993), and
Edlin (1994). For a critical review of some of these works see Liao and White (2002), and Bar-Gill and
Ben-Shahar (2003).
6See, Parisi and Fon (2004, p. 359).
3(See Parisi and Fon, 2004, pp. 361-62, 364, Table 1). That is, the authors have claimed
that the diligent (non-negligent) strategies are not dominant strategies.
In contrast, we will show that under the rule of Comparative Causation Under Neg-
ligence, in an equilibrium, parties cannot both be negligent. That is, in an equilibrium,
parties both cannot take less than the due care. Indeed, appealing to an existing claim
in the literature, we are able to show that, in any equilibrium, neither the injurer nor the
victim can be negligent (that is, each party will take at least the due level of care). In
other words, we show that diligent strategies are dominant strategies for both the parties.
Therefore, multiple equilibria, if exist, will involve at least the due care by both the parties.
The framework of analysis in this paper is less restrictive than the standard frame-
work. Regarding variables and functions, our framework has the virtue of relying on a
fewer assumptions about continuity, diﬀerentiability, functional forms, etc. In particular,
our analysis is equally applicable for both continuous as well as discrete variables.7 Re-
garding the causation function, the mainstream focus has been on two forms of causal
relationship; namely, the cases of causal complements and causal substitutes. In this pa-
per, we allow a very general form of the causation function. Section 2 introduces the
framework of analysis that outlines the notations and assumptions made in the paper. In
Section 3, we investigate the eﬃciency implications of causal apportionment of liability,
when both activity levels and care levels are variable. We conclude in Section 4 with
remarks on the analysis in the paper.
2. Framework of Analysis
We consider accidents resulting from the interaction of two parties who are strangers
to each other. Both parties are assumed to be rational and risk-neutral. Each party’s
behaviour potentially contributes to causing an accident. However, when an accident
takes place, the entire loss falls on one party to be called the victim; the other party will
7Feldman and Frost (1998) have argued that the discrete and sometimes dichotomous care is the
reality of many accident settings.
4be called the injurer. Following Parisi and Fon (2004), parties’ choice of activity levels
as well as care levels aﬀect the causation of an accident. An accident is less likely to
occur if a party decreases its activity level or increases its precaution, and vice-versa.
In other words, a party’s contribution to the causation of an accident increases, if it
increases its activity level or decreases its care level. We refer to the parties’ individual
contributions to causation of an accident as causal inputs. Therefore, a party’s causal
input will increase with the increase in its activity level, and decrease with the increase
in its care level. Causation of an accident depends on the causal inputs of the parties
involved. The elements contributing to the overall social cost of accident, are the cost of
harm occasioned by an accident, the cost of care, and the cost of reducing the parties’
activity levels.
Following the notation in Parisi and Fon (2004), we denote by:8
x care level for the injurer,
y care level for the victim,
z activity level for the injurer,
u activity level for the victim,
X = {x | x is some feasible level of care for the injurer },
Y = {y | y is some feasible level of care for the victim},
Z = {z | z is some feasible level of activity for the injurer },
U = {u | u is some feasible level of activity for the victim},
w the beneﬁt function for the injurer,
b the beneﬁt function for the victim,
D loss per unit of activity, D ≥ 0,
cI the causal input of the injurer,
cV the causal input of the victim,
C the total causation function,
s the injurer’s share in accident loss,
t the victim’s share in accident loss, such that t = 1 − s.
8These are conventional notation (see, e.g. Miceli (1997)).
5We assume:
(A1): w is a function of z and x; w = w(z,x). Beneﬁts to the injurer increase with his
activity level up to a point, i.e., w initially increases with z but ultimately decreases. w
reaches a maximum at zp(x), for given x ∈ X. Increasing care is costly to the injurer,
hence w is a decreasing function of x, for all z ∈ Z. Likewise,
(A2): b is a function of u and y; b=b(u,y). b initially increases with the victim’s activity
level, u, but ultimately decreases. b reaches a maximum at up(y), for given y ∈ Y . b is a
decreasing function of y, for all u ∈ U.
(A3): D is a function of x and y; D = D(x,y). Clearly, D ≥ 0. D is a non-increasing
function of care level of each party. That is, a larger care by either party, given the care
level of the other party, results in lesser or equal accident loss. As D is loss per unit of
activity, for given z and u total loss will be zuD(x,y).
(A4): cI is a function of z and x; cI = cI(z,x). cI increases with z and decreases with x.
(A5): cV is a function of u and y; cV = cV(u,y). cV increases with u and decreases with
y.
(A4) and (A5) imply that by increasing its activity level or reducing its care level, a party
increases its contribution to the causation of an accident, i.e., make the accident more
likely, and vice-versa.
(A6): C, the total causation function, is an increasing function of both cI and cV;
C = C(cI,cV). Therefore, C is an increasing function of both z and u, and a decreasing
function of x and y.
(A7): Social beneﬁts from activity of a party are fully internalized by that party.
(A8): Social goal is to maximize the net social beneﬁts from the activities of the parties;
the net social beneﬁts are equal to the total social beneﬁts minus the total social costs of
accident.
(A9): Beneﬁt, cost, and causation functions are such that there is a unique tuple of
z,u,x, and y, denoted by ((z∗,x∗),(u∗,y∗)) that is socially optimal. In other words, net
social beneﬁts are maximized, if the injurer chooses z∗ as his activity level and x∗ as his
care level, and the victim opts for u∗ as his activity level and y∗ as his care level. There-
fore, z∗ and x∗, respectively, denote the activity level and the care level for the injurer
6that are optimal from social point of view; and u∗ and y∗, respectively, are the activity
level and the care level of the victim that are optimal from social point of view.
(A10): The legal due care standard (i.e., the negligence standard) for the injurer, wher-
ever applicable (say under the rule of negligence), is set at x∗. Similarly, the legal neg-
ligence standard of care for the victim, wherever applicable (say under the rule of strict
liability with defense) is set at y∗.
(A11): cI(.), cV(.), C(.) D(.) are all positive.
It should be noted that assumptions (A1)-(A11) are standard assumptions.9 However,
on several counts, our framework is less restrictive than the standard framework. For one,
regarding the variables and functional forms, in mainstream analyses it is generally taken
that the care levels as well as the activity levels are continuous variables, and various
functions (e.g., the beneﬁt function, the expected loss functions, and so on) are diﬀer-
entiable. Our modelling, in contrast, does not impose any such condition, and is more
general in that it is equally applicable for continuous as well as discrete variables. For
another, regarding the causation function, Parisi and Fon (2004) have considered only two
forms of C(cI(z,x),cV(u,y)), namely when C(cI(z,x),cV(u,y)) = cI(z,x). cV(u,y), and
when C(cI(z,x),cV(u,y)) = cI(z,x) + cV(u,y). The ﬁrst one is called the case of causal
complements and the second one is called the case of causal substitutes. However, in the
literature it has been argued that causal inputs of the parties can aﬀect the causation of
an accident in several diﬀerent ways. In some cases causal inputs aﬀect causation of an
accident additively, while in other cases they can do so multiplicatively, or some times
even a mix thereof (Parisi and Fon 2004; Landes and Posner, 1983).10 In this paper, we
allow a very general form of the causation function. In fact, the only restriction imposed
is the assumption (A6).
The social objective is to maximize the net social beneﬁts from the activities. There-
9e.g., see Miceli (1997), and Parisi and Fon (2004).
10Also see Rizzo and Arnold (1980 and 1986), Kaye and Aickin (1984), Wright (1985), and Kruskal
(1986).
7fore, the social optimization problem is given by:11
max
z,x,u,y w(z,x) + b(u,y) − C(c
I(z,x),c
V(u,y))zuD(x,y).
A liability rule can be considered as a rule or a mechanism that determines the pro-
portions in which the victim and the injurer will bear the accident loss, as a function of
their care and activity levels. Depending on the care and activity levels of the victim and
the injurer, a liability rule uniquely determines the proportions in which they are to bear
the accident loss. That is, given the choice of z and x by the injurer, and u and y by the
victim, a liability rule determines the injurer’s share, s(z,x,u,y), and the victim’s share,
t(z,x,u,y), of accident loss.12 For a party, payoﬀ from engaging in an activity depends
on its activity level, its care level, and the proportion of accident loss it will be required
to bear under the liability rule in force. Therefore, choice of care and activity level by
a party will depend on the liability rule in force, as well as the care and activity levels
of the other party. For any given pair (u,y) opted by the victim and depending on the
rule, the injurer being rational and risk-neutral will choose a pair (z,x) that maximizes
his expected payoﬀ. In other words, given (u,y) ∈ U × Y opted by the victim, problem
facing the injurer is
max
z,x w(z,x) − s(z,x,u,y)C(c
I(z,x),c
V(u,y))zuD(x,y).
Likewise, given (z,x) ∈ Z × X opted by the injurer, problem facing the victim is
max
u,y b(u,y) − t(z,x,u,y)C(c
I(z,x),c
V(u,y))zuD(x,y),
where s(z,x,u,y) and t(z,x,u,y) are determined by the relevant liability rule, but are
such that s + t = 1.
11This formulation of social optimization problem is as in Parisi and Fon (2004).
12It should be noted that in the standard literature, these share depend on only the care levels of the
parties involved. Since I want to re-examine the results in Parisi and Fon (2004), share are assumed to
depend on care as well as activity levels of the parties. Later, however, we show that results in this paper
hold, even when these share are determined only on the basis of the care levels of the parties.
8A liability rule is said to be eﬃcient iﬀ it motivates both the parties to take socially
eﬃcient care and activity levels. Formally, a liability rule is eﬃcient iﬀ ((z∗,x∗),(u∗,y∗))
is a unique Nash equilibrium (N.E.) under the rule.13
3. Comparative Causation
In this section, we consider the two rules introduced and analyzed in Parisi and Fon
(2004); the rule of Pure Comparative Causation, and the rule of Comparative Causation
Under Negligence.
Pure Comparative Causation
Under the rule of Pure Comparative Causation, as deﬁned by Parisi and Fon, for
given (z,x) and (u,y) opted by the injurer and the victim, respectively, the injurer’s
share in accident loss is equal to
cI(z,x)
cI(z,x)+cV (u,y). Therefore, the victim’s share is given
by
cV (u,y)
cI(z,x)+cV (u,y). Formally, the rule of Pure Comparative Causation, can be deﬁned as
follows:








In their analysis, Parisi and Fon have argued that under this rule, the injurer [the
victim] will choose some x < x∗ [y < y∗] as care level and some z > z∗ [u > u∗] as activity
level (see Parisi and Fon, 2004, pp. 355, 357, 364). They have argued that since each
party bears only a fraction of the loss, there is an incentive to choose less than socially
optimal care and more than socially optimal activity level. In other words, the rule of
Pure Comparative Causation induces neither eﬃcient care levels nor eﬃcient activity lev-
els. Next, we consider the rule of Comparative Causation Under Negligence, as proposed
by Parisi and Fon.
13We consider only pure strategy Nash equilibria. A tuple ((¯ z, ¯ x),(¯ u, ¯ y)) is said to be a N.E. iﬀ given
(¯ u, ¯ y) opted by the victim, (¯ z, ¯ x) is a best response from the view point of the injurer, and vice-versa.
The use of the notion of N.E. as prediction for equilibrium outcome is very common in the literature on
liability rules.
9Comparative Causation Under Negligence
Under this rule, when a party is found solely negligent, the entire loss is borne by this
party. In other words, whenever the injurer is negligent and the victim is not, the victim
receives full compensation for the loss. If the victim is negligent and the injurer is not,
the victim bears the entire loss. Accident loss is shared between the parties only in cases
where parties are either both negligent or when both are non-negligent. In such cases,
the loss-sharing is done as under the rule of Pure Comparative Causation. This rule,
therefore, captures an essential feature of traditional negligence-criterion based rules; a
solely negligent party bears the entire accident loss, and the other (non-negligent) party
bears none of it. Yet, the rule allows sharing of accident loss that is consistent with the
rule of Pure Comparative Causation, when neither of the parties is unilaterally negligent.
Summing up, under this rule, given (u,y) ∈ U ×Y opted by the victim, the problem faced
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if x ≥ x∗ and y ≥ y∗, or x < x∗ and y < y∗;
w(z,x) − C(cI(z,x),cV(u,y))zuD(x,y) if x < x∗ and y ≥ y∗.
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if x ≥ x∗ and y ≥ y∗,or x < x∗ and y < y∗;
b(u,y) − C(cI(z,x),cV(u,y))zuD(x,y) if x ≥ x∗ and y < y∗.
Note that under the rule of Comparative Causation Under Negligence if both the
parties take eﬃcient care, then they share accident loss according to the requirement of
pure comparative causation. Therefore, if this rule could induce both the parties to take
eﬃcient care and activity levels, it will have the unique virtue of being eﬃcient as well as
10equitable.
However, regarding the behaviour of the parties under the rule of Comparative Cau-
sation Under Negligence, Parisi and Fon (2004) have stated the following propositions:
(1) In equilibrium, parties are never induced to take more than the due care; (2) Multiple
equilibria in which one or both the parties take less than the due care are possible; (3)
In some contexts, the choice of the due care by both the parties is also a possibility; (4)
Though there is an incentive to mitigate activity levels, each party’s activity level will
be greater than the corresponding socially optimal level. (See Parisi and Fon, 2004, pp.
361-62, 364, Table 1). That is, the authors have concluded that for the parties the diligent
(non-negligent) strategies are not dominant strategies. Therefore, in an equilibrium, the
level of care taken the injurer, x, and the level of care taken the victim, y, will be such
that x ≤ x∗ and y ≤ y∗.14 In particular, in an equilibrium, any of the following can hold:
(i) x < x∗ and y < y∗, (ii) x < x∗ and y = y∗, (iii) x = x∗ and y < y∗, and (iv) x = x∗
and y = y∗.
In contrast, we will show that under the rule of Comparative Causation Under Negli-
gence, the claims (i)-(iii) cannot be true. We show that in any equilibrium, x < x∗ and
y < y∗, i.e., the claim (i) above, can never hold. Appealing to an already existing claim
in the literature, we show that claims (ii) and (iii) cannot hold. Indeed, care levels x and
y can be part of an equilibrium, only if x ≥ x∗ and y ≥ y∗. In other words, we show that
diligent strategies are dominant strategies for both the parties.
First of all, note that an essential feature of negligence-criterion based rules is captured
by the following property:
Property (P1): A non-negligent party has no liability, if the other party is negligent.
In the following, we investigate the behavior of parties under rules that satisfy property
14See Parisi and Fon, 2004, pp. 362, 364, Table 1.
11(P1). To start with, we show that under a liability rule that satisﬁes property (P1), the
parties cannot both be negligent in a N.E., no matter how the liability is assigned when
both parties are negligent.15 In other words, in any Nash equilibrium, x < x∗ and y < y∗
can never hold.
To see why, take any ((z,x),(u,y)) such that x < x∗ and y < y∗. Suppose, the injurer
opts for (z,x) and the victim for (u,y). At ((z,x),(u,y)), let s(z,x,u,y) be the injurer’s
share of loss, where 0 ≤ s(z,x,u,y) ≤ 1. So, t(z,x,u,y) = 1 − s(z,x,u,y). As a result,
suppressing the arguments of s and t, at ((z,x),(u,y)), the payoﬀ of the victim is
b(u,y) − t C(c
I(z,x),c
V(u,y))zuD(x,y).
On the other hand, given that (z,x) is opted by the injurer, if the victim instead opts
for (u∗,y∗), then the injurer will be solely negligent. In that case, in view of (P1), the
injurer’s liability is full and that of the victim is none. Therefore, given that (z,x) is opted
by the injurer, if the victim opts for (u∗,y∗), his payoﬀ will be b(u∗,y∗). Similarly, at
((z,x),(u,y)) the payoﬀ of the injurer are w(z,x)−s C(cI(z,x),cV(u,y))zuD(x,y). But,
given that (u,y) is opted by the victim, should the injurer opt instead for (z∗,x∗), his payoﬀ
will be w(z∗,x∗). At ((z,x),(u,y)) if w(z∗,x∗) > w(z,x)−sC(cI(z,x),cV(u,y))zuD(x,y),
a unilateral deviation by the injurer to (z∗,x∗) will be strictly proﬁtable. In that case,
((z,x),(u,y)) cannot be a N.E. Thus, if ((z,x),(u,y)) is a N.E., then a unilateral deviation
by the injurer to (z∗,x∗) cannot be strictly proﬁtable. Therefore, assume that
w(z,x) − sC(cI(z,x),cV(u,y))zuD(x,y) ≥ w(z∗,x∗) (1)
Since ((z,x),(u,y)) 6= ((z∗,x∗),(u∗,y∗)), by assumption, we know that
w(z∗,x∗) + b(u∗,y∗) − C(cI(z∗,x∗),cV(u∗,y∗))z∗u∗D(x∗,y∗) >
w(z,x) + b(u,y) − C(cI(z,x),cV(u,y))zuD(x,y). (2)
Subtracting w(z∗,x∗) from the LHS and w(z,x) − s(cI(z,x),cV(u,y))zuD(x,y) from the
RHS of (2), in view of (1), we get
15It should be noted that an equilibrium in Parisi and Fon (2004) will be a N.E.
12b(u∗,y∗) − C(cI(z∗,x∗),cV(u∗,y∗))z∗u∗D(x∗,y∗) >
b(u,y) − tC(cI(z,x),cV(u,y))zuD(x,y). (3)
Now, since C(cI(z∗,x∗),cV(u∗,y∗))z∗u∗D(x∗,y∗) ≥ 0, from (3) we have b(u∗,y∗) > b(u,y)−
tC(cI(z,x),cV(u,y))zuD(x,y). That is, given (z,x < x∗) opted by the injurer, payoﬀ of
the victim is strictly greater if he chooses (u∗,y∗) rather than (u,y), i.e., the victim will
be better oﬀ opting (u∗,y∗) rather than (u,y). Again, ((z,x),(u,y)) cannot be a N.E.
In other words, under a liability rule satisfying (P1), from any ((z,x),(u,y)) such that
x < x∗ & y < y∗, either the injurer will ﬁnd unilaterally deviation to (z∗,x∗) proﬁtable,
or the victim will ﬁnd unilaterally deviation to (u∗,y∗) proﬁtable. Hence, we have the
following result.
Proposition 1 If a liability rule satisﬁes property (P1), then
(∀((z,x),(u,y))) [x < x∗ & y < y∗ ⇒ ((z,x),(u,y)) cannot be a N.E.].
Note that how a liability rule assign liability when parties are both negligent has no
implications for the validity of Proposition 1. Moreover most of the negligence criterion
based rules discussed in the literature (e.g., the rule of negligence, the rule of negligence
with the defense of contributory negligence, the rule of strict liability with the defense
of contributory negligence) satisfy property (P1). Therefore, under all these rules both
the parties cannot be negligent in an equilibrium. In particular, the rule of Comparative
Causation Under Negligence, as deﬁned in Parisi and Fon (2004), satisﬁes property (P1).
Hence, we can make the following claim about the rule.
Proposition 2 Under the rule of Comparative Causation Under Negligence,
(∀((z,x),(u,y))) [x < x∗ & y < y∗ ⇒ ((z,x),(u,y)) cannot be a N.E. ].
Remark 1: Suppose a liability rule satisﬁes property (P1). When x ≥ x∗ and y < y∗,
the victim is solely negligent. In such an event, due to property (P1), the injurer has
no liability. So, for given z his payoﬀ is w(z,x). Note that w(z,x) increases with z and
deceases with x. Therefore, regardless of the z opted by him whenever x > x∗, the in-
jurer can increase his payoﬀ simply by reducing x until he reaches at x∗. This means
that the injurer will be better oﬀ opting x∗ rather than any x > x∗. As a result, any
13tuple ((z,x),(u,y)), such that x > x∗ & y < y∗, cannot be a N.E. In fact, when the rule
satisﬁes property (P1), in the region of x ≥ x∗ and y < y∗, w(z,x) is uniquely maximized
at (x∗,z∗
p), where z∗
p = zp(x∗). Therefore, under the rule, when x ≥ x∗ and y < y∗, a tuple
((z,x),(u,y)) can be a N.E. only if (z,x) = (z∗
p,x∗). Similarly, under a rule satisfying




It will be interesting to compare the incentive eﬀects of the rule of Comparative Cau-
sation Under Negligence with those of the standard rules discussed in the literature.
Regarding the standard negligence-criterion based rules the following claim exists in the
literature (e.g., see Miceli, 1997 p. 29, Dari Mattiacci (2002), Parisi and Fon, 2004 Table
1, p. 364).16
Claim (C1): Both the rule of negligence as well as the rule of strict liability with the
defense of contributory negligence induce eﬃcient care levels from both the parties. That
is, the claim is that under these rules, there exist an equilibrium in which the injurer and
the victim opt for x∗ and y∗, respectively.
Remark 2: It should be noted that the Claim (C1) is only regarding the care levels;
activity levels are not claimed to be eﬃcient. Moreover, equilibrium under the rule of
negligence will be diﬀerent from that under the rule of the strict liability with the defense
of contributory negligence. The claim, however, implies that under both the rules, when
(x,y) 6= (x∗,y∗), a tuple ((z,x),(u,y)) cannot be a N.E.
Equipped with the claim (C1), Proposition 3 shows that under the rule of Comparative
Causation Under Negligence, in equilibrium, neither of the parties can be negligent. In
an equilibrium, both parties will take at least the due level of care. Formally, care levels
x and y can be part of a N.E., only if x ≥ x∗ and y ≥ y∗.
16Also see Landes and Posner (1987) and Shavell (1987) as cited in Parisi and Fon (2004).
14Proposition 3 Given that (C1) holds, under the rule of Comparative Causation Under
Negligence, ((z,x),(u,y)) is a N.E. ⇒ x ≥ x∗ & y ≥ y∗.
Proof: In view of Proposition 1, a tuple ((z,x),(u,y)) such that x < x∗ and y < y∗,
cannot be a N.E. Thus, to prove the claim, it will be suﬃcient if we can show that under
the rule, a tuple ((z,x),(u,y)) such that x ≥ x∗ and y < y∗, or x < x∗ and y ≥ y∗ cannot
be a N.E.
Consider a tuple ((z,x),(u,y)) such that x ≥ x∗ and y < y∗. Since the rule in question
satisﬁes (P1), in view of Remark 1, when x ≥ x∗ and y < y∗, a tuple ((z,x),(u,y)) can
be a N.E. only if (z,x) = (z∗
p,x∗), where z∗
p = zp(x∗). Therefore, to show that a tuple
((z,x),(u,y)) such that x ≥ x∗ and y < y∗ cannot be a N.E., we just have show that
tuple ((z∗
p,x∗),(u,y)), where y < y∗, cannot be a N.E. Similarly, to show that a tuple
((z,x),(u,y)), such that x < x∗ and y ≥ y∗, cannot be a N.E., we just have show that
tuple ((z,x),(u∗
p,y∗)), where x < x∗ and u∗
p = up(y∗), cannot be a N.E.
First, we consider whether a tuple ((z∗
p,x∗),(u,y)), such that y < y∗, is a N.E. or
not. Suppose, (z∗
p,x∗) is opted by the injurer. Notice that under the rule of Comparative
Causation Under Negligence, when (z∗
p,x∗) is opted by the injurer, if the victim chooses






puD(x∗,y∗). And, if he instead chooses
some (u,y), such that y < y∗, he will be solely negligent. In that case, under the rule
he will be required to bear the entire accident loss. Therefore, when (z∗
p,x∗) is opted
by the injurer, if the victim chooses some (u,y) such that y < y∗, his payoﬀ will be
b(u,y) − C(cI(z∗
p,x∗),cV(u,y))z∗
puD(x∗,y). In the following, we show that given (z∗
p,x∗)
opted by the injurer, the victim will be better oﬀ opting y∗ along with a suitable u ∈ U,
rather than any y < y∗.
We are given that Claim (C1) holds, i.e., under the rule of negligence, in equilibrium,
the injurer opts for x∗ and the victim opts for y∗. When x = x∗, the injurer is non-
negligent. Therefore, under the rule of negligence he has no liability, i.e., for given z his
payoﬀ is w(z,x∗), which is uniquely maximized at z = z∗
p, where z∗
p = zp(x∗). In other
words, the claim implies that under the rule of negligence, the injurer will opt for (z∗
p,x∗).
15On the other hand, when x = x∗, the victim bears the entire loss. Therefore, if he opts
for some (u,y) his payoﬀ is b(u,y) − C(cI(z∗
p,x∗),cV(u,y))z∗
puD(x∗,y). In view of Claim
(C1), along with y∗, the victim will choose a u ∈ U, say ¯ u, that maximizes his payoﬀ.17
In other words, given that the injurer has opted for (z∗
p,x∗), under the rule of negligence
(¯ u,y∗) is a best choice for the victim. Formally put, the claim implies that there exists
¯ u ∈ U such that between (¯ u,y∗), on the one hand, and any (u,y) ∈ U × Y , on the other,










p,x∗)+cV (¯ u,y∗) < 1 and C(cI(z∗
p,x∗),cV(¯ u,y∗))z∗
p¯ uD(x∗,y∗) > 0, we get

















p¯ uD(x∗,y∗). In particular, for all (u,y) ∈










In other words, for all (u,y < y∗) ∈ U × Y , there exists (¯ u,y∗) ∈ U × Y such that
(6) holds. Note that under the rule of Comparative Causation Under Negligence if we
assume that the injurer has opted for (z∗
p,x∗), then the left hand side of (6) denotes the
payoﬀ of the victim when he opts for some (u,y) ∈ U × Y , such that y < y∗. The right
hand side of (6) denotes the payoﬀ of the victim, when he instead opts for (¯ u,y∗). But,
(6) implies that given that (z∗
p,x∗) is opted by the injurer, the victim is better oﬀ opting
(¯ u,y∗) rather than any (u,y) such that y < y∗. Thus, under the rule of Comparative
Causation Under Negligence, any ((z∗
p,x∗),(u,y)), such that y < y∗, cannot be a N.E.
17We assume that such u exists. In that case, it should be noted that Claim 1 implies that under the
rule of negligence, ((z∗
p,x∗),(¯ u,y∗)) is a N.E.
16Similarly, appealing to the claim that under the rule of strict liability with the defense
of contributory negligence, the injurer opts for x∗ and the victim opts for y∗, and arguing
as above, we can show the following: Under the rule of Comparative Causation Under
Negligence, given that (u∗
p,y∗) is opted by the victim, the injurer will not choose any (z,x)
such that x < x∗. That is, a tuple ((z,x),(u∗
p,y∗)), such that x < x∗, cannot be a N.E.
Thus, under the rule, any ((z,x),(u,y)) such that x < x∗ & y ≥ y∗, or x ≥ x∗ & y < y∗
cannot be a N.E. •
Remark 3: It should be noted that for Propositions 1 and 2 to hold, the suﬃcient con-
dition is the Property (P1). The condition concerns liability assignment when one party
is negligent and the other is not, regardless of the activity levels of the parties. Therefore,
for these claims to hold, liability assignment need not be based on the activity levels of
the parties. For Proposition 3, the suﬃcient condition is provided by the Property (P1)
along with Claim (C1). Again, it can be checked that liability need not depend on the
activity levels of the parties.18
4. Concluding Remarks
Parisi and Fon (2004) is an important contribution to the tort literature in that it is
ﬁrst systematic study of the liability assignment based on comparative causation. How-
ever, we have shown that some of the propositions in the study need re-examination.
We have shown that under the rule of Comparative Causation Under Negligence, in an
equilibrium, choice of less than the due care by both parties is not possible. In fact, in
any equilibrium, neither of the parties can be negligent. It immediately follows from out
results that multiple equilibria, if they exist, will involve at least the due care by both
the parties. Therefore, the search for the existence of an equilibrium should focus on the
cases which involve the due or more than the due care by both the parties; not on the
cases wherein one or both the parties are negligent, as Parisi and Fon suggest.
18Of course, to the extant that liability does not depend on the activity levels of the parties, liability
assignment will be diﬀerent from what is required under the rules of comparative causation.
17Note that under the rule of Comparative Causation Under Negligence, when both
parties take at least the due care, a party bears only a fraction of the total accident loss.
Now, when both parties are non-negligent, suppose a party increases its activity level
beyond the socially optimal level for this party. In such a scenario, this party will bear
only a fraction of the resulting increase in the social costs. On the other hand, all the
beneﬁts from increased activity level will accrue to the party. As a result, excess activity
levels seem to be a possibility. Regarding the care levels, however, the opposite in true;
a party bears full cost of the care taken by it, while sharing the beneﬁts of care with the
other party. This means that there are incentives for parties to take less care. But, at
the same time, under the rule the following is also true. When a party increases its care
level beyond the due level, the loss that will be shared as well as the party’s share in the
loss come down. This means there are some incentives for the parties to take excess care.
Moreover, it can be shown that productivity of care increases with the increase in the
activity levels of the parties. Therefore, in the non-negligence region parties face various
prospects with conﬂicting implications. In such a scenario, whether there will be a unique
equilibrium, no equilibrium, or multi-equilibria, is an important question that requires
further research.
Finally, it should be noted that while proving Propositions 1-3, we have not restricted
the functional form of the causation function. Therefore, our results hold in a more gen-
eral context of the causal relationship. The Propositions are, of course, valid for the cases
of causal substitutes and causal complements, which are two special forms of the causation
function.
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